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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Respondent's Brief raises two new issues.

These are

the issue of estoppel and waiver (treated in Point III of
Respondent's Brief); and whether the plaintiff can recover
for the damages sustained within 90 days previous to the
filing of his claim under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
(as treated in Point IV of the Respondent's Brief).
This Reply Brief treats only these new issues.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE. SALT LAKE COUNTY IS NOT
ESTOPPED TO ASSERT THE PROVISIONS OF
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
This Court has considered the issue of estoppel for the
governmental entity to assert as a defense the provisions of
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act on four occasions.

These

cases, taken together, clearly define the law on the issue
of estoppel.

The first of the cases decided was Rice v. Granite

Schaar District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969).

In

that case plaintiff was injured when she fell from a wooden
bleacher which was maintained by the defendant school district.
Immediately following her accident she filed a notice of
claim with the authorities of the high school.

Shortly

thereafter, she was contacted by the school district's
insurance adjuster, who advised her that she would be cornpensated for her damages as soon as the costs thereof were
ascertained and she was released by her doctor.

During the

next several months she was again contacted by the insurance
adjuster, who reassured her that the insurance company would
accept responsibility.
Finally, after the time for filing suit had expired,
the insurance company informed the plaintiff that her claim
had been denied.

Under these facts this Court reversed a

.Summary Judgment on behalf of the school district and held
that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-2Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.

the school district should be estopped from asserting the
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

So holding,

the court said:
~e cannot justly or equitably lull an adver-

~ary.~nto.a fal~e
]ect~ng h~s cla~

sense of security, thereby subto the bar of limitations, and
then be heard to plead that very delay as a defense
to the action when brought. Acts or conduct which
wrongfully induce a party to believe an amicable
adjustment of his claim will be made may create an
estoppel against pleading the statute of limitations.
23 Utah 2d at 28, 456 P.2d at 163.
The second of these cases is Varoz v. Sevey, 29 Utah 2d
158, 506 P.2d 436 (1973).

In that case the plaintiff's

decedent was killed in an automobile accident which allegedly
resulted from inadequate warning signs.

Shortly after the

accident, the plaintiff's attorney contacted Salt Lake
County and was erroneously told that the section of the road
in question was maintained by the Utah State Highway Department.

Acting on this information, the plaintiff's attorney

filed a notice of claim with the State of Utah.

After the

claim was denied by the State of Utah on the basis that the
section of road was actually maintained by Salt Lake County,
the plaintiff's attorney filed notice of claim with Salt
Lake County, but by that time the 90 day period for filing
had expired.

The trial court granted a motion to dismiss

and this court affirmed, holding that the legislature intended
to make the filing of a timely notice of claim prerequisite
to maintaining an action against a governmental entity.

The
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court also impliedly held that there was no waiver or estoppel to assert the provisions of the Governmental Immunity
Act in that case.
In Whitaker v. Salt Lake City, 522 P.2d 1252 (Utah
1974), the plaintiff was injured in a cave-in on a hillside
adjacent to a park owned and maintained by Salt Lake City.
In this case, like Rice, the notice of claim was filed

within the prescribed time, but the plaintiff's attorney
failed to file the

~uit

because the city's attorney had

assured him that there would be a settlement within the
policy limits and thereby lulled him into believing that no
suit need be filed.

This court held that these allegations

created a sufficient question of fact to require submission
of the estoppel issue to the jury.
The final case in this series is Scarborough v. Granite
School District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975).

In Scarborough,

the minor plaintiff was injured on a school ground as a
result of dead electrical wires which had been left dangling
from the poles.

The principal was immediately informed of

the child's injury and the child's parent had a discussion
with the school principal about the responsibility for the
accident.

The school principal erroneously told the plaintiff's

mother that the wires had been left in the dangling condition
by the utility company, Utah Power & Light.
In reliance. on the information obtained from the school
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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principal, the plaintiff pursued her claim against Utah
Power & Light rather than the school district.

By the time

the plaintiff's attorney discovered that school district
employees, rather than Utah Power & Light, left the wires
dangling the time for filing a notice of claim with the
school district had expired.

The court discussed the Rice

case and held as follows:
There are significant differences between
this case and that one. There the plaintiff had
filed a timely written notice with the school
district. The plaintiff's contention was that
the insurance adjuster, who was handling the
matter for the school district, gave the plaintiff assurances that the case would be settled
after the extent of injuries and damages had
been determined, and that this lulled her into
a sense of security until after the time for
filing the suit had expired.

[I]t is our conclusion that the trial
court could properly rule as a matter of law
that because of the plaintiff's failure to file
a claim in the time allowed by the statute; and
because there is no basis upon which estoppel
against the defendant's reliance on the statute
could be made out, she cannot show entitlement
to maintain this action.
These four cases, taken together, clearly establish the
elements of estoppel under the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act.

In both Rice and Whitaker, where the court held that

there was submissible issue on the question of estoppel, the
plaintiff had filed the timely notice with a governmental
entity but had failed to file the action within the limitation period thereafter.

In both Rice and Whitaker, the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plaintiff claimed that a representative of the governmental
entity had promised that payment would be forthcoming and
thereby lulled the plaintiff into a false sense of security
and a belief that filing a lawsuit would not be necessary.
In Varoz and Scarborough, where the court held that
there was not a submissible issue of fact on the issue of
estoppel, the plaintiff had failed to act because of false
information that it had been supplied by representatives of
the governmental

~ntity.

But in neither of these cases did

the governmental entity admit liability or tell the plaintiff
that payment would be forthcoming.
When a potential defendant denies liability for whatever
reason, the plaintiff is put on notice that the defendant
intends to make no payment.

The plaintiff knows at that

point that legal action must be taken.
no estoppel can arise.

In such an instance

Of course, if the defendant is

guilty of fraud or concealment, the time period is tolled
until discovery of the fraud or concealment.

For an estoppel

to occur, however, the defendant must lull the plaintiff
into a false sense of security by promising payment or
admitting liability.
In this case the evidence is not that Salt Lake

Cou~ty

admitted liability and promised to pay, but that it disclaimed liability.

At that point, according to the Utah

cases, the plaintiff is made aware that in order to proceed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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further, a formal claim must be made against the governmental entity.
POINT II. PLAINTIFF CANNOT RECOVER FOR
THE DAMAGES OCCURRING IN THE 90 DAYS
PREVIOUS TO THE FILING OF CLAIM.
This Court has previously considered the issue of the
running of the statute of limitations for continuing torts
or nuisances.

Johnson v. Utah-Idaho Central RR., 68 Utah

309, 249 P. 1036 (1926) was a case very similar to the one
at bench·in that a continuing nuisance was alleged.

The

railroad had built its tracks near the plaintiff's property,
causing depreciation to the value of the property.

The

plaintiff claimed that the statute of limitations did not
run against a continuous nuisance.

The court held:

Where the wrong done by the railroad company

is temporary in its nature, as in leaving cars
unnecessarily on its tracks, or while engaged in
the work of laying down its track, something
existing today and not tomorrow, fluctuating in
extent and depending on the ever-repeated action
of the company, only such damages as have fully
accrued prior to the commencement of the suit
are recoverable, and none based upon any presumed
continuance or repetition of the wrong. But where
the wrong is of a permanent nature and springs
from the manner in which the track, as fully completed, affects approach to the lot, then, notwithstanding the right which the State retains
to control the manner of use of the highway or
a railroad company, even if deemed necessary to
compel an entire removal of its track, the lot
owner may treat the act of the company as a
permanent appropriation of the right of access
to his lot, and recover as damages the consequent
depreciation in value of the lot.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

Consequently, the court affirmed a directed verdict in
favor of the defendant.

This rule accords the general rule

followed throughout the United States as exemplified in the
case of Power Farms, Inc. v. Consolidated Irrigation District,
119 P.2d 717 (Cal. 1941).

The Respondent's Brief makes

assertion that this case related to an injury that occurred
at one time.

The facts of the case clearly indicate, how-

ever, that this was a case involving property damage which
had occurred through water seeping over a 2-year period.
This rule also accords with the rule stated in 54
C.J.S., Limitations of Actions, §173:
Ordinarily limitations as to a cause of
action for damages caused by percolation or
seepage of water or oil run from the date of
the injury for which suit is brought or from
the date on which injury becomes apparent or
discoverable by due diligence.
Most significant, however, is the fact that this case
was not tried upon the theory that the plaintiff could only
recover damages which had occurred in the 90 days previous
to the filing of the claim.

Since the trial court ruled

that the claim need not be filed until the cause of the
damages was discovered and that the cause of the damages was
not discovered, as a matter of law, until August of 1974, no
evidence was presented as to what amount of damages occurred
during this period.

Mr. Lynn Jones, who visited the property

a year earlier, testified that the damage that he could see

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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at that time could be repaired for $500 (Record, 123).

He

did not see the property any time in the 90 days previous to
the filing of the notice of claim, however.

Even at the

time he did view the property and make the estimate of $500
to caulk the cracks, he did not make an inspection in the
drainage pipe or under the foundation to determine whether
such erosion had taken place, that further supporting work
needed to be done at that time.

Because the ruling of the

trial court made similar evidence irrelevant, no rebuttal
to Mr. Jones' estimate was presented.

Furthermore, no

evidence was presented as to whether the nuisance was continuous or reoccurring.

The plaintiff asserts in his brief

that "the storm drain pipe is relatively dry and without
water most of the time and is periodic in nature and usually
only contains water when there is a rainstorm or inclement
weather in Olympus Cove in the Holladay area."

This is not

supported by evidence, however, because there was no reason
to establish this fact at the trial.
If the court should find that the plaintiff is entitled
to recover for the damages that accrued within the 90-day
period previous to the filing of the claim, these issues
would have to be resubmitted to a jury.
CONCLUSION
If the plaintiff can produce evidence that Salt Lake
County was guilty of concealment or misrepresentation which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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was the cause of plaintiff's failure to file his notice of
claim under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, then Salt
Lake County is clearly barred from asserting this defense.
No such evidence was presented at trial, however.
Conversely, there is no issue which can be legitimately
submitted to a jury as to whether Salt Lake County is estopped
to assert the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act.
The Utah case law, and the case law in the United
States generally, holds that the cause of action runs from
the time the damage has occurred and the claim is totally
barred after the statutory period expires.

Even if this

Court were to hold, however, that the plaintiff could recover
for the damages which occurred in the 90 days previous to
the filing of the claim, there is no evidence, at this
point, on which the court could make a determination as to
how much damages had occurred.
Respectfully submitted this ~ day of

~r~y

1978.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

s~~

Scott Daniels
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